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a b s t r a c t
We consider the problem of computing additively approximate Nash equilibria in non-
cooperative two-player games.We provide a new polynomial time algorithm that achieves
an approximation guarantee of 0.36392.We first provide a simpler algorithm, that achieves
a 0.38197-approximation, which is exactly the same factor as the algorithm of Daskalakis,
Mehta and Papadimitriou. This algorithm is then tuned, improving the approximation error
to 0.36392. Our method is relatively fast and simple, as it requires solving only one linear
program and it is based on using the solution of an auxiliary zero-sum game as a starting
point. Finally we also exhibit a simple reduction that allows us to compute approximate
equilibria for multi-player games by using algorithms for two-player games.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The dominant and most well studied solution concept in noncooperative games has been the concept of the Nash
equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a choice of strategies, one for each player, such that no player has an incentive to deviate
(unilaterally). In a series of works [10,5,3], it was established that computing a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-complete even for
two-player games. The focus has since then been on algorithms for approximate equilibria.
In this work we focus on the notion of additive approximation and consider the problem of computing approximate Nash
equilibria in bimatrix games. Under the usual assumption that the payoff matrices are normalized to be in [0, 1]n×n (where
n is the number of available pure strategies), we say that a pair of mixed strategies is an -Nash equilibrium if no player
can gain more than  by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. In [4] it was proved that it is PPAD-complete to find an
-Nash equilibrium when  is of the order 1poly(n) . For a constant  however, the problem is still open. In [13], it was shown
that for any constant  > 0, an -Nash equilibrium can be computed in subexponential time (nO(log n/
2)). As for polynomial
time algorithms, it is fairly simple to obtain a 3/4-approximation (see [11] for a slightly better result) and even better a
1/2-approximation [6]. An improved approximation for  = 3−
√
5
2 + ζ ≈ 0.38197 + ζ for any ζ > 0 was obtained by
Daskalakis, Mehta and Papadimitriou in [7]. Finally, the currently best known approximation factor of 0.3393 was given by
Spirakis and Tsaknakis in [15].1 Their methodology relies on a gradient-based approach and for more details on this and
related results we refer the reader to [16].
I A preliminary version of this paper has appeared as [2]. The results presented here were obtained when all the authors worked at CWI in Amsterdam.∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +41 21 693 4392; fax: +41 21 693 5840.
E-mail addresses: bosse@math.uni-frankfurt.de (H. Bosse), Jaroslaw.Byrka@epfl.ch (J. Byrka), vangelis@cwi.nl (E. Markakis).
1 Interestingly, as noted in [16], a simpler analysis of the algorithm of [15] with a subset of the inequalities that they use in deriving their upper bound
also gives a 0.38197 approximation.
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Our contribution. We provide two new algorithms for approximate Nash equilibria. The first one achieves exactly the same
factor as [7] butwith a simpler technique. The second one,which is an extension of the first and has amore involved analysis,
achieves an improved approximation of 0.36392. Regarding the running time, both algorithms are quite fast and require the
solution of a single linear program.
Our technique is inspired by [12] and the fact that we can compute exact Nash equilibria for zero-sum games in
polynomial time via linear programming. In particular, [12] have used the equilibria of zero-sum games of the form
(R+ δZ,−(R+ δZ)), for appropriate values of δ, to derivewell-supported approximate equilibria, which is a stronger notion
of approximation. Here R and C are the payoff matrices of the two players and Z = −(R+ C). In both of our algorithms we
use a similar starting point as follows: we first find an equilibrium (say x∗, y∗) in the zero-sum game (R− C, C − R). If x∗, y∗
is not a good solution for the original game, we then fine-tune the solution and the players take turns and switch to some
appropriately chosen strategies. The probabilities of switching are chosen such that the final incentives to deviate become
the same for both players. As a result, these probabilities are functions of the parameters of the problem. The final part of
the analysis then is to choose these functions so as to minimize the approximation error.
The intuition behind using the auxiliary zero-sum game (R−C, C−R) is that a unilateral switch from x∗, y∗ that improves
the payoff of one player also improves the payoff of the other player, since x∗, y∗ is chosen to be an equilibriumwith respect
to R − C . This allows us to estimate upper bounds on the final incentive of both players to deviate, which we can later
optimize. We explain this further in the proof of Theorem 1. At the same time, through our analysis, we discover some of
the limitations of using such zero-sum games in deriving approximations for general games by showing that our choice of
parameters in Section 4 is optimal for the one-round greedy adjustment framework that we consider.
Finally in Section 6, we show a simple reduction that allows us to compute approximate equilibria for games with more
than two players by using algorithms for two-player games. We obtain a 0.60205-approximation for three-player games
and 0.71533-approximation for four-player games. To the best of our knowledge these are the first nontrivial polynomial
time approximation algorithms for multi-player games.
2. Notation and definitions
Consider a two person game G, where for simplicity the number of available (pure) strategies for each player is n. Our
results still hold when the players do not have the same number of available strategies. We will refer to the two players as
the row and the column player and we will denote their n× n payoff matrices by R, C respectively. Hence, if the row player
chooses strategy i and the column player chooses strategy j, the payoffs are Rij and Cij respectively.
A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over the set of his pure strategies and will be represented by a
vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)T, where xi ≥ 0 and∑ xi = 1. Here xi is the probability that the player will choose his ith pure
strategy. The ith pure strategy will be represented by the unit vector ei, that has 1 in the ith coordinate and 0 elsewhere. For
a mixed strategy pair x, y, the payoff to the row player is the expected value of a random variable which is equal to Rij with
probability xiyj. Therefore the payoff to the row player is xTRy. Similarly the payoff to the column player is xTCy.
A Nash equilibrium [14] is a pair of strategies x∗, y∗ such that no player has an incentive to deviate unilaterally. Since
mixed strategies are convex combinations of pure strategies, it suffices to consider only deviations to pure strategies:
Definition 1. A pair of strategies x∗, y∗ is a Nash equilibrium if:
(i) For every pure strategy ei of the row player, eTi Ry
∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗, and
(ii) For every pure strategy ei of the column player, (x∗)TCei ≤ (x∗)TCy∗.
Assuming that we normalize the entries of the payoff matrices so that they all lie in [0, 1], we can define the notion of
an additive -approximate Nash equilibrium (or simply -Nash equilibrium) as follows:
Definition 2. For any  > 0, a pair of strategies x∗, y∗ is an -Nash equilibrium iff:
(i) For every pure strategy ei of the row player, eTi Ry
∗ ≤ (x∗)TRy∗ + , and
(ii) For every pure strategy ei of the column player, (x∗)TCei ≤ (x∗)TCy∗ + .
In other words, no player will gain more than  by unilaterally deviating to another strategy. Other approximation
concepts have also been studied. In particular, [5] introduced the stronger notion of -well-supported equilibria, in which
every strategy in the support set should be an approximate best response. Another stronger notion of approximation is that
of being geometrically close to an exact Nash equilibrium and was studied in [8]. We do not consider these concepts here.
For more on these concepts, we refer the reader to [12,16,8].
3. A ( 3−
√
5
2 )-approximation
In this section, we provide an algorithm that achieves exactly the same factor as in [7], which is (3 − √5)/2, but by
using a different and simpler method. In the next section we show how to modify our algorithm in order to improve the
approximation.
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Given a game G = (R, C), where the entries of R and C are in [0, 1], let A = R − C . Our algorithm is inspired by [12],
as mentioned in the Introduction, and is based on solving the zero-sum game (A,−A) and then modifying appropriately
the solution, if it does not provide a good approximation. It is well known that zero-sum games can be solved efficiently
using linear programming. The decision on when to modify the zero-sum solution depends on a parameter of the algorithm
α ∈ [0, 1]. We first describe the algorithm parametrically and then show how to obtain the desired approximation.
Algorithm 1. Let α ∈ [0, 1] be a parameter of the algorithm.
1. Compute an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for the zero-sum game defined by the matrix A = R− C .
2. Let g1, g2 be the incentive to deviate for the row and column player respectively if they play (x∗, y∗) in the original
game (R, C), i.e., g1 = maxi=1,...,n eTi Ry∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ and g2 = maxi=1,...,n (x∗)TCei − (x∗)TCy∗. Without loss of generality,
assume, that g1 ≥ g2 (the statement of the algorithm would be completely symmetrical if g1 < g2).
3. Let r1 ∈ argmaxei eTi Ry∗ be an optimal response of the row player to the strategy y∗. Let b2 ∈ argmaxei rT1Cei be an optimal
response of the column player to the strategy r1.
4. Output the following pair of strategies, (xˆ, yˆ), depending on the value of g1 with respect to the value of α:
(xˆ, yˆ) =
{
(x∗, y∗), if g1 ≤ α
(r1, (1− δ2) · y∗ + δ2 · b2), otherwise
where δ2 = 1−g12−g1 .
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 outputs amax{α, 1−α2−α }-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If g1 ≤ α (recall that we assumed g1 ≥ g2), then clearly (x∗, y∗) is an α-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Suppose g1 > α. We will estimate the satisfaction of each player separately. Suppose b1 is an optimal response for the
row player to yˆ, i.e., b1 ∈ argmaxei eTi Ryˆ. The row player plays r1, which is a best response to y∗. Hence b1 can be better than
r1 only when the column player plays b2, which happens with probability δ2. Formally, the amount that the row player can
earn by switching is at most:
bT1Ryˆ− rT1Ryˆ = (1− δ2)(bT1Ry∗ − rT1Ry∗)+ δ2(bT1Rb2 − rT1Rb2)
≤ δ2 · bT1Rb2 ≤ δ2 =
1− g1
2− g1 .
The first inequality above comes from the fact that r1 is a best response to y∗ and the second comes from our assumption
that the entries of R and C are in [0, 1].
Consider the column player. The critical observation, which is also the reason we started with the zero-sum game
(R − C, C − R), is that the column player also benefits (when he plays y∗) from the switch of the row player from x∗ to
r1. In particular, since (x∗, y∗) is an equilibrium for the zero-sum game (R− C, C − R), the following inequalities hold:
(x∗)TRej − (x∗)TCej ≥ (x∗)TRy∗ − (x∗)TCy∗ ≥ eTi Ry∗ − eTi Cy∗, ∀ i, j = 1, . . . , n. (1)
If ei = r1, we get from (1) that rT1Cy∗ ≥ rT1Ry∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ + (x∗)TCy∗. However, we know that rT1Ry∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ = g1,
which implies:
rT1Cy
∗ ≥ g1 + (x∗)TCy∗ ≥ g1. (2)
Inequality (2) shows that any deviation of the row player from x∗, y∗, that improves his payoff, guarantees at least the same
gain to the column player as well. We can now use the lower bound of (2) to estimate the incentive of the column player to
change his strategy. He plays yˆwhile he would prefer to play an optimal response to xˆwhich is b2. Since b2 is played with a
probability δ2, by switching he could earn:
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCyˆ = rT1Cb2 − rT1Cyˆ
= rT1Cb2 − ((1− δ2)rT1Cy∗ − δ2 · rT1Cb2)
= (1− δ2)(rT1Cb2 − rT1Cy∗)
≤ (1− δ2)(1− g1) = δ2 = 1− g12− g1 .
The last inequality above follows from (2). The probability δ2was chosen so as to equalize the incentives of the two players to
deviate in the case that g1 > α. It is noweasy to check that the function (1−g1)/(2−g1) is decreasing, hence the incentive for
both players to deviate is atmost (1−α)/(2−α). Combinedwith the casewhen g1 ≤ α, we get amax{α, 1−α2−α }-approximate
equilibrium. 
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In order to optimize the approximation factor of Algorithm 1, we only need to equate the two terms, α and 1−α2−α , which
then gives:
α2 − 3α + 1 = 0. (3)
The solution to (3) in the interval [0, 1] is α = 3−
√
5
2 ≈ 0.38197. Note that α = 1 − 1/φ, where φ is the golden ratio.
Since α is an irrational number, we need to ensure that we can still do the comparison g1 ≤ α to be able to run Algorithm 1
(note that this is the only point where the algorithm uses the value of α). However, to test g1 ≤ 3 −
√
5/2, it suffices to
test if (3 − 2g1)2 ≥ 5 and clearly g1 is a polynomially sized rational number. Concerning complexity, zero-sum games can
be solved in polynomial time by linear programming. All the other steps of the algorithm require only polynomial time.
Therefore, Theorem 1 implies:
Corollary 2. We can compute in polynomial time a 3−
√
5
2 -approximate Nash equilibrium for bimatrix games.
4. An improved approximation
In this section we obtain a better approximation of 1/2 − 1/(3√6) ≈ 0.36392 by essentially proposing a different
solution in the cases where Algorithm 1 approaches its worst case guarantee. We first give some motivation for the new
algorithm. From the analysis of Algorithm 1, one can easily check that as long as g1 belongs to [0, 1/3] ∪ [1/2, 1], we can
have a 1/3-approximation if we run the algorithm with any α ∈ [1/3, 1/2). Therefore, the bottleneck for getting a better
guarantee is when the maximum incentive to deviate is in [1/3, 1/2]. In this case, we will change the algorithm so that the
row player will play a mix of r1 and x∗. Note that in Algorithm 1, the probability of playing r1 is either 0 or 1 depending on
the value of g1. This probability will now be amore complicated function of g1, derived from a certain optimization problem.
As for the column player, we again compute b2 which is now the best response to the mixture of r1 and x∗- not only to r1.
Then we compute an appropriate mixture of b2 and y∗. Again, the probability of playing b2 is chosen so as to equate the
incentives of the two players to defect. Finally we should note that our modification will be not on [1/3, 1/2] but instead
on a subinterval of the form [1/3, β], where β is derived from the optimization that we perform in our analysis.
Algorithm 2.
1. Compute an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for the zero-sum game defined by the matrix A = R− C .
2. As in Algorithm 1, let g1, g2 be the incentive to deviate for the row and column player respectively if they play (x∗, y∗)
in the original game, i.e., g1 = maxi=1,...,n eTi Ry∗ − (x∗)TRy∗ and g2 = maxi=1,...,n (x∗)TCei − (x∗)TCy∗. Without loss of
generality, assume, that g1 ≥ g2.
3. Let r1 ∈ argmaxei eTi Ry∗ be an optimal response of the row player to the strategy y∗.
4. The row player will play a mixture of r1 and x∗, where the probability of playing r1 is given by:
δ1 = δ1(g1) =
{0, if g1 ∈ [0, 1/3]
∆1(g1), if g1 ∈ (1/3, β]
1, otherwise
where∆1(g1) = (1− g1)
(
−1+
√
1+ 11−2g1 − 1g1
)
.
5. Let b2 be an optimal response of the column player to ((1− δ1)x∗+ δ1r1), i.e., b2 ∈ argmaxei ((1− δ1)x∗ + δ1r1)TCei. Let
also h2 = (x∗)TCb2 − (x∗)TCy∗, i.e., the gain from switching to b2 if the row player plays x∗.
6. The column player will play a mixture of b2 and y∗, where the probability of playing b2 is given by:
δ2 = δ2(δ1, g1, h2) =

0, if g1 ∈ [0, 1/3]
max{0,∆2(δ1, g1, h2)}, if g1 ∈ (1/3, β]
1−g1
2−g1 , otherwise
where∆2(δ1, g1, h2) = δ1−g1+(1−δ1)h21+δ1−g1 .
7. Output (xˆ, yˆ) = ((1− δ1)x∗ + δ1r1, (1− δ2)y∗ + δ2b2).
In our analysis, we will take β to be the solution to ∆1(g1) = 1 in [1/3, 1/2], which coincides with the root of the
polynomial x3 − x2 − 2x+ 1 in that interval and it is:
β = 1
3
+
√
7
3
cos
(
1
3
tan−1
(
3
√
3
))
−
√
21
3
sin
(
1
3
tan−1
(
3
√
3
))
. (4)
Calculations show 0.445041 ≤ β ≤ 0.445042. The emergence of β in our analysis is explained in Lemma 3.
Remark 1. The actual probabilities δ1 and δ2 can be irrational numbers (and so is β). However, for any constant  > 0, we
can take approximations of a high enough accuracy of all the square roots that are involved in the calculations so that the
final loss in the approximation ratio will be at most . From now on, for ease of exposition, we will carry out the analysis of
Algorithm 2, as if we can compute exactly all the expressions involved.
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Note that for g1 ∈ [ 13 , 12 ] and δ1 ∈ [0, 1] the denominators that appear in the functions ∆1, ∆2 do not vanish. The
following lemma ensures that xˆ is a valid strategy. It will be proved in Section 5. That yˆ is also a valid strategy is proved
within Lemma 4.
Lemma 3. For g1 ∈ (1/3, β] we have∆1(g1) ∈ [0, 1].
Now we bound the incentives of players to deviate. Let F be the following function:
F(δ1, g1, h2) := (δ1 (1− g1 − h2)+ h2) (1− (1− δ1)h2)1+ δ1 − g1 . (5)
Lemma 4. The pair of strategies (xˆ, yˆ) is a λ-Nash equilibrium for game (R, C) with
λ ≤

g1 if g1 ≤ 1/3
max
h2∈[0,g1]
{
F(δ1, g1, h2) if∆2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0
(1− δ1)g1 if∆2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0 if g1 ∈ (1/3, β]
1−g1
2−g1 if g1 > β.
(6)
Proof. In the case that g1 ∈ [0, 1/3] ∪ [β, 1], the answer essentially follows from the proof of Theorem 1. The interesting
case is when g1 ∈ [1/3, β].
Case 1. g1 ≤ 1/3
(xˆ, yˆ) = (x∗, y∗)which is by definition a g1-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Case 2a. g1 ∈ (1/3, β] and∆2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0.
Recall that Lemma 3 implies xˆ is a valid strategy in Case 2. Note that δ2(g1, δ1, h2) = ∆2(g1, δ1, h2) = δ1−g1+(1−δ1)h21+δ1−g1 ≤ 1
is a valid probability, and therefore yˆ is a valid mixed strategy too.
We estimate the incentive for the row player to deviate from xˆ. If b1 is an optimal response to yˆ, then the gain from
switching is at most:
bT1Ryˆ− xˆTRyˆ = (b1 − xˆ)TRyˆ = δ2(b1 − xˆ)TRb2 + (1− δ2)(b1 − xˆ)TRy∗
≤ δ2(1− xˆTRb2)+ (1− δ2)(b1 − xˆ)TRy∗
= δ2(1− δ1rT1Rb2 − (1− δ1)(x∗)TRb2)
+ (1− δ2)(δ1(b1 − r1)TRy∗ + (1− δ1)(b1 − x∗)TRy∗).
By (1) we have (x∗)TRb2 ≥ (x∗)TCb2− (x∗)TCy∗+ (x∗)TRy∗ ≥ h2. Also r1 is a best response to y∗, hence (b1− r1)TRy∗ ≤ 0
and (b1 − x∗)TRy∗ ≤ g1. Therefore, the gain from deviating is at most:
bT1Ryˆ− xˆTRyˆ ≤ δ2(1− (1− δ1)h2)+ (1− δ2)(1− δ1)g1 = EST1.
We now estimate the incentive of the column player to switch. The best response to xˆ for the column player is b2, which
is played with a probability δ2. Thus the incentive to deviate from yˆ is:
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCyˆ = (1− δ2)(xˆTCb2 − xˆTCy∗)
= (1− δ2)((1− δ1)((x∗)TCb2 − (x∗)TCy∗)+ δ1(rT1Cb2 − rT1Cy∗))
≤ (1− δ2)((1− δ1)h2 + δ1(1− g1)) = EST2.
The last inequality follows from the definitions of g1 and h2. It remains to observe that our choice of δ2(δ1, g1, h2) =
δ1−g1+(1−δ1)h2
1+δ1−g1 makes these estimates both equal to F(δ1, g1, h2):
EST1 = EST2 = (δ1 (1− g1 − h2)+ h2) (1− (1− δ1)h2)
δ1 + 1− g1 = F(δ1, g1, h2).
Case 2b. g1 ∈ (1/3, β] and∆2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0.
Then yˆ = y∗ and the best response of the row player is r1. Hence he can improve his payoff by at most
rT1Ry
∗ − xˆTRy∗ = rT1Ry∗ − (δ1 · rT1Ry∗ + (1− δ1)((x∗)TRy∗)) = (1− δ1)g1
while the column player can improve by at most
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCy∗ = δ1(rT1Cb2 − rT1Cy∗)+ (1− δ1)((x∗)TCb2 − (x∗)TCy∗).
By (1) we can see that rT1Cy
∗ ≥ g1. Hence
xˆTCb2 − xˆTCy∗ ≤ δ1(1− g1)+ (1− δ1)h2.
It is easy to check that∆2(g1, δ1, h2) < 0 implies δ1(1−g1)+(1−δ1)h2 < (1−δ1)g1. Therefore themaximum incentive
to deviate in this case is at most (1 − δ1)g1. Combining Case 2a and Case 2b, and taking the worst possible case over the
range of h2 (recall that h2 ≤ g2 ≤ g1), we get precisely the expression in the statement of Lemma 4.
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Fig. 1. How the approximation factor depends on g1 .
Case 3. g1 > β
Notice that in this case, the players are playing the same strategies as in Algorithm 1, when g1 ≥ α. By the analysis in the
proof of Theorem 1, we see that the maximum incentive is (1− g1)/(2− g1). 
We will now argue that our choice of ∆1(g1) is optimal for any g1 ∈ ( 13 , β] and that the expression (6) from Lemma 4
achieves an improvement over Algorithm1. For this, we need to find theworst possible approximation in Case 2 of Lemma 4.
In particular, we need to look at the maxima of the following function:
P(g1) := min
δ1∈[0,1]
max
h2∈[0,g1]
{
F(δ1, g1, h2) if ∆2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0
(1− δ1)g1 if ∆2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0. (7)
Lemma 5. The tuple (δ1, h2) = (∆1(g1), g1) is an optimal solution for the expression P(g1). Furthermore, the maximum of P(g1)
over g1 is 12 − 13√6 , i.e., the following holds
P(g1) = F(∆1(g1), g1, g1) ∀g1 ∈
[
1
3
,
1
2
]
(8)
max
g1∈[ 13 ,β]
P(g1) = 12 −
1
3
√
6
≤ 0.36392. (9)
The lemma will be proven in Section 5. Given Remark 1, we are now ready to conclude with the following:
Theorem 6. For any  > 0, Algorithm 2 computes a (0.36392+ )-approximate Nash equilibrium.
Proof. By Lemma4 the output of Algorithm2, (xˆ, yˆ) is a pair ofmixed strategies for players, such that the incentive of players
to deviate is bounded by (6). By Lemma5wehave that for g1 ∈ (1/3, β] the expression (6) is bounded by 12− 13√6 ≤ 0.36392.
It is easy to observe, that for other values of g1 the expression (6) takes only smaller values. In particular, it is at most 1/3
when g1 ∈ [0, 1/3] and at most 1−β2−β ≈ 0.3569 when g1 > β . The dependence of the approximation on the variable g1 is
presented in Fig. 1. 
A tight example:. The analysis that we have presented is tight. Tracing all inequalities used, we constructed the following
worst-case example, on which Algorithm 2 yields a 0.36392-approximate equilibrium:
R =
(0 α α
α 0 1
α 1 0
)
C =
(0 α α
α 1 1/2
α 1/2 1
)
where α = 1/√6.
5. Proof of Lemmas 3 and 5
Proof of Lemma 3. We show that∆1 maps [1/3, β] into [0, 1], where∆1 (see Algorithm 2) is defined as
∆1(g1) := (1− g1)
(
−1+
√
1+ 1
1− 2g1 −
1
g1
)
.
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It is easy to check that ∆1(1/3) = 0. We will show that ∆1 is real-valued and monotone increasing on the interval
[1/3, 1/2). Then we show that 1/3 < β < 1/2, and∆1(β) = 1.
To check that ∆1(g1) takes real values on [1/3, 1/2), it is easy to verify that the radicand, i.e., the expression under the
square root, is nonnegative in this domain.(
1+ 1
1− 2g1 −
1
g1
)
≥ 1 for all g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2). (10)
To check the monotonicity of∆1(g1), we calculate∆′1(g1) and find
∆′1(g1) = 1+
1− 3g1 − 2g21 + 14g31 − 8g41
2(1− 2g1)2g21
√
1+ 11−2g1 − 1g1
> 0 for all g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2). (11)
The inequality in (11) is obtained as follows: Inequality (10) shows that the radicand in (11) is strictly positive on [1/3, 1/2).
So the denominator appearing in∆′1(g1) is real and positive. For the numerator appearing in∆
′
1(g1) the following estimation
holds for all g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2):
1− 3g1 − 2g21 + 14g31 − 8g41 =
1
2
(3+ g1 + (1− g1)(4g1 + 1)( −2+ (1− 2g1)2))
≥ 1
2
(3+ g1 + (1− g1)(4g1 + 1)( −2 ))
= 1
2
((
1− 5
2
g1
)2
+ 7
4
g21
)
> 0.
Here the first inequality holds since g1 ∈ [1/3, 1/2) implies (1− g1)(4g1 + 1) > 0. This proves (11) showing that∆1 is
strictly increasing on the interval [1/3, 1/2).
Now we calculate g ∈ [1/3, 1/2) for which∆1(g) = 1 holds. In the following let x ∈ [1/3, 1/2). This implies 0 < 2− x
and 0 < 1− x, which together with (10) gives rise to the second equivalence in the following:
∆1(x) = 1 ⇔ (2− x) = (1− x)
√
1+ 11−2x − 1x
⇔ (2− x)2 = (1− x)2 (1+ 11−2x − 1x ) ⇔ 1− 2x− x2 + x3 = 0.
The polynomial p(x) := 1− 2x− x2 + x3 has exactly one zero in [1/3, 1/2], since p is monotone decreasing on this domain:
One calculates p′(x) = −2x − 2(1 − 3x2) ≤ −2x < 0 for all x ∈ [1/3, 1/2]. Moreover one has p(1/3) = 7/27 and
p(1/2) = −1/8, showing that p has a root within the interval.
Substituting x = 13
(
1+√7 cos (α)−√21 sin (α)
)
and α = arctan(t)/3 leads to
1− 2x− x2 + x3 = 7
27
(
1−√28 cos(3α)
)
= 7
27
(
1−
√
1+ 27√
1+ t2
)
where the last term is zero for t = 3√3. Resubstitution shows that p(β) = 0 holds for
β = 1
3
(
1+√7 cos (α)−√21 sin (α)
)
where α = 13 arctan
(
3
√
3
)
. Taylor expansion of the corresponding terms leads to 0.445041 < β < 0.445042, proving
β ∈ [1/3, 1/2). This shows∆1(β) = 1, which proves the lemma. 
In the proof of Lemma 5 we will make repeated use of the following simple observation:
Fact 7. The square function is monotone increasing on the positive domain, i.e.,
a− b ≥ 0⇔ a2 − b2 ≥ 0 holds for all a, b ∈ R, a, b ≥ 0. (12)
We solved the univariate minimization problems that arise in Lemma 5 in the classic manner, eventually leading to the
minimizer ∆1(g). This procedure is lengthy, so here we give an uninspiring but shorter proof. The proof is based on the
following Lemma:
Lemma 8. For every pair (g, δ) ∈ [1/3, β] × [0, 1] we find
F(δ, g, g) = max
h∈[0,g]
{
F(δ, g, h) if ∆2(δ, g, h) ≥ 0
(1− δ)g if ∆2(δ, g, h) < 0 (13)
F(∆1(g), g, g) = min
d∈[0,1] F(d, g, g). (14)
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We postpone the proof of Lemma 8 until the end of this Section.
Proof of Lemma 5. Combining (13) and (14) from Lemma 8 we obtain
F(∆1(g1), g1, g1) = min
δ1∈[0,1]
max
h2∈[0,g1]
{
F(δ1, g1, h2) if ∆2(δ1, g1, h2) ≥ 0
(1− δ1)g1 if ∆2(δ1, g1, h2) < 0.
For ease of exposition, we drop the subscripts of the variables from now on. Hence we are left to prove
maxg∈[ 13 ,β] F(∆1(g), g, g) =
1
2 − 13√6 ≤ 0.36392 where
F(∆1(g), g, g) = 14 −
1
4
(1− 2g)(3− 2g)(4g − 1) + 2(1− g)
√
g(1− 2g)(−1+ 4g − 2g2).
It is easy to check that (10) implies that the radicand g(1− 2g)(−1+ 4g− 2g2) is nonnegative for all g ∈ [1/3, β]. We now
prove that the maximum of F(∆(g), g, g) on [ 13 , β] is assumed in 1/
√
6 : Straightforward calculation leads to
F ∗ := F
(
∆(1/
√
6) , 1/
√
6 , 1/
√
6
)
= 1
2
− 1
3
√
6
.
Fixing g ∈ [1/3, β] (arbitrarily), one finds:
F ∗ − F (∆1(g), g, g) = 14 −
1
3
√
6
+ 1
4
(1− 2g)(3− 2g)(4g − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0(∗)
− 2 (1− g)
√
g(1− 2g)(−1+ 4g − 2g2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 (∗∗)
.
Here (∗) and (∗∗) are implied by the choice of g , i.e., (3 − 2g) ≥ 2(1 − g) ≥ (1 − 2g) ≥ 0, and 4g − 1 ≥ 1/3 > 0 hold.
Finally since
√
6 > 2 we have 14 − 13√6 > 112 > 0.
The inequalities in (∗) and (∗∗) together with (12) lead to the equivalence
F ∗ − F (∆1(g), g, g) ≥ 0 ⇔(
1
4
− 1
3
√
6
+ 1
4
(1− 2g)(3− 2g)(4g − 1)
)2
− 4(1− g)2 (g(1− 2g)(−1+ 4g − 2g2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
(
11
18+ 23√6 (3−g)+(1−g)2
)(
g− 1√
6
)2
≥ 0.
Here the second inequality holds for the chosen g , since the term can be reformulated as shown under the brace, where
(3− g) > 0 holds by the restriction g ∈ [1/3, β].
Thus we showed F ∗ = F(∆1(1/
√
6), 1/
√
6, 1/
√
6) ≥ F(∆1(g), g, g), proving the lemma, since g ∈ [1/3, β] was
chosen arbitrarily and 1/
√
6 ∈ [1/3, β] is implied by 0.40 ≤ 1/√6 ≤ 0.41 < β . 
It now remains to prove Lemma 8.
Proof of Lemma 8. Fix some pair (g, δ) ∈ [1/3, β] × [0, 1]. We rewrite (13) as
F(δ, g, g) ≤
(
max
h∈[0,g]
{
F(δ, g, h) if ∆2(δ, g, h) ≥ 0
(1− δ)g if ∆2(δ, g, h) < 0
)
≤ max
h∈[0,g]
F(δ, g, g) (15)
and prove it as follows: A brief calculation together with (1 − g) > 0 lead to ∆2(δ, g, g) = (1 − g)δ/(1 − g + δ) ≥ 0. So
there is a h∗ ∈ [0, g], namely h∗ := g , such that∆2(δ, g, h∗) ≥ 0. This implies the first inequality in (15).
Observe that to prove the second inequality in (15), it suffices to show that
F(δ, g, g) ≥ (1− δ)g and F(δ, g, g) ≥ F(δ, g, h) for all h ∈ [0, g] (16)
both hold – independently of the value of ∆2. A quick calculation proves the first inequality of (16): Recall that the choice
on (g, δ) implies (1− g) ≥ 0, 2δg ≥ 0, and (1− 2g) ≥ 0, yielding
F(δ, g, g)− (1− δ)g = (1− g) δ
(1− g)+ δ (2δg + (1− 2g) ) ≥ 0.
To obtain the second inequality of (16), we show that for the chosen δ, g , the function F(δ, g, h) is monotone non-decreasing
on h ∈ [0, g]: Recalling h ≤ g ≤ 1/2 we find (1− 2h) ≥ 0, implying
dF(δ, g, h)
dh
= (1− 2h)(1− δ)
2 + gδ(1− δ)
(1− g)+ δ ≥ 0.
This finally proves (16), and thus the second inequality in (15), concluding the proof of (13).
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To prove (14) fix some d ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily and define p(g) := g(1 − 2g)(−1 + 4g − 2g2), which is the radicand
appearing in F(∆1(g), g, g). A brief calculation leads to
(F(d, g, g)− F(∆1(g), g, g)) (1− g + d) =(
(4g −1)(1−g)3 + 2g(1−2g)(1−g)d+ g(1−2g)d2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 (?)
− 2(1− g + d)(1− g)√p(g)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 (??)
.
To obtain (?), recall 1/3 < β < 1/2 and observe that the restrictions on g, d imply g, d ≥ 0 as well as (4g − 1) ≥ 0,
(1 − g) ≥ 0, and (1 − 2g) ≥ 0. Moreover we have (1 − g + d) > (1 − g) ≥ 0, showing (??). Recall also that (10) implies
that p(g) ≥ 0 for the chosen g . Hence exploiting (1− g + d) > 0 and Fact 7 we obtain:
F(d, g, g)− F(∆1(g), g, g) ≥ 0
⇔ ((4g −1)(1−g)3 + 2g(1−2g)(1−g)d+ g(1−2g)d2)2 − 4(1− g + d)2(1− g)2p(g) ≥ 0
⇔ ((1−3g)(1−g)2 + 2g(1−2g)(1−g)d+ g(1−2g)d2)2 ≥ 0.
The last inequality is trivially true, which finally proves (14) since (g, d) ∈ [1/3, β] × [0, 1]were chosen arbitrarily. 
6. Games with more than 2 players
In this section we consider games with more than two players. A Nash equilibrium for multi-player games is defined in
the same way as for two-player games. It is a choice of strategies such that no agent has a unilateral incentive to deviate.
We show now how the simple 1/2-approximation algorithm for two players by Daskalakis et al. [6] may be generalized to
a procedure that reduces the number of players in the computation of an approximate equilibrium.
Lemma 9. Given an α-approximation algorithm for games with k− 1 players, we can construct a 12−α -approximation algorithm
for k-player games.
Proof. Supposewe are given a gamewith k players. Pick any player, e.g. the first player, and fix any strategy x1 for this player.
If the first player’s strategy is fixed at x1, the game becomes a k − 1 player game. Hence we may use the α-approximation
algorithm to obtain anα-approximate equilibrium (x2, . . . , xk) for the players 2, . . . , k in this restricted game. Finally, player
1 computes his optimal response r1 to (x2, . . . , xk) and plays a mix of his original strategy x1 and the new strategy r1. Let δ
be the probability that player 1 plays r1. Hence the output of this construction is ((1− δ)x1 + δr1, x2, . . . , xk).
We will nowmeasure the quality of this construction. The incentive to deviate for player 1 may be bounded by 1− δ. For
the other players the incentive may be bounded by α(1− δ)+ δ. By equalizing the incentives we get δ = 1−α2−α , which gives
the upper bound for the incentive 1− δ = 12−α . 
We may now repeatedly apply Lemma 9 combined with the 0.3393-approximation for two-player games of Spirakis
and Tsaknakis [15] to get constant factor approximations for any fixed number of players. In particular, we get 0.60205-
approximation for three player games and 0.71533-approximation for four-player games. To the best of our knowledge this
is the first nontrivial polynomial time approximation for multiplayer normal form games.
7. Discussion
In general, our algorithms produce solutions with large support. This is no surprise, as implied by the negative results on
the existence of approximate equilibrium strategies with small support given in [1,9].
The major remaining open question here is whether a polynomial time algorithm for any constant  > 0 is possible. It
would be interesting to investigate if we can exploit further the use of zero-sum games to obtain better approximations. We
would also like to study whether our techniques can be used for the stronger notions of approximation discussed in [12,8].
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